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CRYPTO
TOPICS AND APPLICATIONS I
Jennifer Seberry, Chris Charnes, Josef Pieprzyk, and Rei Safavi-Naini
Centre for Computer Security Research, University of Wollongong

1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we discuss four related areas of cryptology, namely: Authentication, Hashing,
Message Authentication Codes (MACs), and Digital Signatures. These topics represent currently
active and growing research topics in cryptology. Due to space limitations, we concentrate only
on the essential aspects of each topic. The bibliography is intended to supplement our survey.
We have included suciently many items to provide the interested reader with an overall view
of the current state of knowledge in the above areas.
Authentication deals with the problem of providing assurance to a receiver that a communicated message originates from a particular transmitter, and that the received message has the
same content as the transmitted message. A typical authentication scenario occurs in computer networks, where the identity of two communicating entities is established by means of
authentication.
Hashing is concerned with the problem of providing a relatively short ngerprint of a much
longer message or electronic document. A hashing function must satisfy (at least) the critical
requirement that the ngerprints of two distinct messages are distinct. Hashing functions have
numerous applications in cryptology. They are often taken as primitives in constructing other
cryptographic functions.
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) are symmetric key primitives that provide message integrity against active spoo ng by appending a cryptographic checksum to a message which is
veri able only by the intended recipient of the message. Message authentication is one of the
most important ways of ensuring the integrity of information which is transferred by electronic
means.
Digital signatures provide electronic equivalents of handwritten signatures. They preserve the
essential features of handwritten signatures, and can be used to sign electronic documents.
Digital signatures can potentially be used in legal contexts.

2 AUTHENTICATION
One of the main goals of a cryptographic system is to provide authentication, which simply
means providing assurance about the content and origin of communicated messages.
Historically, cryptography began with secret writing and this remained the main area of development until very recently. With the rapid progress in data communication, the need for providing
message integrity and authenticity has escalated to the extent that currently authentication is
seen as the more urgent goal of cryptographic systems.
1

Traditionally, it was assumed that a secrecy system provides authentication by the virtue of the
secret key being only known by the intended communicants; this would prevent an enemy from
constructing a fraudulent message. Simmons [66] argued that the two goals of cryptography
are independent. He shows that a system that provides perfect secrecy might not provide any
protection against authentication threats. Similarly, a system can provide perfect authentication
without concealing messages.
In the rest of this chapter, we use the term communication system to encompass message transmission as well as storage. The system consists of a transmitter who wants to send a message, a
receiver who is the intended recipient of the message, and an enemy who attempts to construct
a fraudulent message with the aim of getting it accepted by the receiver unwittingly. In some
cases, there is a fourth party, called the arbiter, whose basic role is to provide protection against
cheating by the transmitter and/or the receiver. The communication is assumed to take place
over a public channel, and hence the communicated messages can be seen by all the principals.
An authentication threat is an attempt by an enemy in the system to modify a communicated
message or inject a fraudulent message into the channel. In a secrecy system the attacker is
passive, while in an authentication system the enemy is active and not only observes the communicated messages and gathers information such as plaintext and ciphertext, but also actively
interacts with the system to achieve its goal. This view of the system clearly explains Simmons'
motivation for basing authentication systems on game theory.
The most important criteria that can be used to classify authentication systems are:

 the relation between authenticity and secrecy;
 the framework for the security analysis.
The rst criterion divides authentication systems into those that provide authentication with and
without secrecy. The second criterion divides systems into systems with unconditional security,
systems with computational security and systems with provable security. Unconditional security
implies that the enemy has unlimited computational power, while in computational security the
enemy's resources are limited and the security relies on the required computation exceeding
the enemy's computational power. A system with provable security is in fact a subclass of
computationally secure systems and its compromise is equivalent to a solution of a known dicult
problem.
These two classi cations are orthogonal and produce four subclasses. Below we review the
basic concepts of authentication theory, some known bounds and constructions in unconditional
security, and then consider computational security.

2.1 Unconditional security
A basic model introduced by Simmons [66] has remained the mainstay of most of the theoretical
research on authentication systems. The model has the same structure as described in the previous section but excludes the arbiter. To provide protection against an enemy, the transmitter
and receiver use an authentication code (A-code). An A-code is a collection E of mappings called
encoding rules (also called keys) >from a set S of source states (also called transmitter states)
into the set M of cryptogram (also called codewords). For A-codes without secrecy, also called
cartesian A-codes, a codeword uniquely determines a source state. That is, the set of codewords
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is partitioned into subsets each corresponding to a distinct source state. In a systematic cartesian A-code, M = S  T where T is a set of authentication tags and each codeword is of the
form s:t; s 2 S ; t 2 T where `.' denotes concatenation. Let the cardinality of the set S of source
states be denoted as k; that is, jSj = k. Let E = jEj and M = jMj. The encoding process adds
key dependent redundancy to the message, so k < M . A key (or encoding rule) e determines a
subset Me  M of codewords that are authentic under e.
The incidence matrix A of an A-code is a binary matrix of size E  M whose rows are labeled
by encoding rules and columns by codewords, such that A(e; m) = 1 if m is a valid codeword
under e, and A(e; m) = 0, otherwise.
An authentication matrix B of a cartesian A-code is a matrix of size E  k whose rows are
labeled by the encoding rules and columns by the source states, and B (e; s) = t if t is the tag
for the source state s under the encoding rule e.
To use the system, the transmitter and receiver must secretly share an encoding rule. The enemy
does not know the encoding rule and uses an impersonation attack, in which it only uses its
knowledge of the system, or a substitution attack in which it waits to see a transmitted codeword,
and then constructs a fraudulent codeword. The security of the system is measured in terms
of the enemy's chance of success with the chosen attack. The enemy's chance of success in an
impersonation attack is denoted by P0 , and in a substitution attack by P1 . The best chance an
enemy has in succeeding in either of the above attacks is called the probability of deception, Pd .
An attack is said to be spoo ng of order ` if the enemy has seen ` communicated codewords
under a single key. The enemy's chance of success in this case is denoted by P` .
The chance of success can be de ned using two di erent approaches. The rst approach corresponds to an average case analysis of the system and can be described as the enemy's payo
in the game theory model. It has been used by a number of authors, including MacWilliams,
Gilbert and Sloane [32], Fak [28], and Simmons [66]. The second is to consider the worst case
scenario. This approach is based on the relation between A-codes and error correcting codes
(also called E-codes).
Using the game theory model, Pj is the value of a zero-sum game between communicants and
the enemy. For impersonation
P0 = mmax
(payo (m));
2M
and for substitution

P1 =

E X
X
j =1 m2M

P (m) max
payo (m; m0);
m0

where P (m) is the probability of a codeword m occurring in the channel, and payo (m; m0) is
the enemy's payo (best chance of success) when it substitutes an intercepted codeword m with
a fraudulent one, m0.

2.2 Bounds on the performance of the A-code
The rst types of bounds relate the main parameters of an A-code, that is, E; M; k, and hence
are usually called combinatorial bounds. The most important combinatorial bound for A-codes
with secrecy is
Pi  Mk ii ; i = 1; 2; : : :
3

and for A-codes without secrecy is

Pi  k=M; i = 1; 2; : : ::
k i for A-codes with
An A-code that satis es these bounds with equality, that is, with Pi = M
i
secrecy and Pi = k=M for cartesian A-codes, is said to provide perfect protection for spoo ng
of order i. The enemy's best strategy in spoo ng of order i for such an A-code is to randomly
select one of the remaining codewords.
A-codes that provide perfect protection for all orders of spoo ng up to r are said to be r-fold
secure. These codes can be characterized using combinatorial structures such as orthogonal
arrays and t-designs.
An orthogonal array OA (t; k; v ) is an array with v t rows, each row of size k, from the elements
of set X of v symbols, such that in any t columns of the array every t-tuple of elements of X
occurs in exactly  rows. Usually t is referred to as the strength of the OA.

Example 1 The following table gives a OA (2; 5; 2) on the set f0; 1g:
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0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0

0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1

0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1

0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0

A t-(v; k; ) design is a collection of b subsets, each of size k, of a set, X , of size v where every
distinct subset of size t occurs exactly  times.
The incidence matrix of a t-(v; k; ) is a binary matrix, A = (aij ), of size b  v such that aij = 1
if element j is in block i and 0 otherwise.

Example 2 The following table gives a 3-(8; 4; 1) design on the set f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7g:
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
2
3
4
5
6
0
1

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
4
5
6
0
1
2
3

1
2
3
4
5
6
0
5
6
0
1
2
3
4
4

3
4
5
6
0
1
2
6
0
1
2
3
4
5

with incidence matrix:

1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0

1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1

0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0

1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1

0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1

0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1

0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

The main theorems relating A-codes with r-fold security and combinatorial structures are due
to a number of authors, including Stinson [69], and Tombak and Safavi-Naini [77]. The following
are the most general forms of these theorems.

Theorem 1 ([77]) Let the source be r-fold uniform. Then an A-code provides r-fold security
against spoo ng if and only if the incidence matrix of the code is the incidence matrix of a
(r + 1)- (M; k; ) design.

In the above theorem, an r-fold uniform source is a source for which every string of r distinct
outputs from the source has probability k(k 1)   1 (k r + 1) .

Theorem 2 Let P0 = P1 = P2 =    = Pr = k=M . Then the authentication matrix is a
OA(r + 1; k; `) where ` = M=k.
The so-called information theoretic bounds characterize the enemy's chance of success using
uncertainty measures. The rst such bound for cartesian A-codes, derived by MacWilliams,
Gilbert and Sloane [32], is
P1  2
where H (M ) is the entropy of the codeword space. The rst general bound on P0 , due to
Simmons [66], is
P0  2 (H (E ) H (E jM ))
where H (E ) is the entropy of the key space and H (E jM ) is the conditional entropy of the key
when a codeword is intercepted. Write I (E ; M ) for the mutual information of E and M . Then,
H (M )

2

P0  2I (E ;M ):
The above bound relates the enemy's best chance of success to the mutual information between
the cryptogram space and the key space. A general form of this bound, proved independently
by Rosenbaum [63] and Pei [47], is
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P`  2I (E ;M ) ;
`

where I (E ; M `) is the mutual information between a string of ` codewords, and where m` is the
key.
Similar bounds for A-codes without secrecy are proved by MacWilliams et al [32] and by Walker
[79].
A general bound on the probability of deception, Pd , derived by Rosenbaum [63], is
r

Pd  2
r

H (E )
r +1

:

2.3 Other types of attack
Tombak and Safavi-Naini [76] consider other types of attacks, similar to those for secrecy systems. In a plaintext attack against A-codes with secrecy, the enemy not only knows the codeword
but also knows the corresponding plaintext. In chosen content attack the enemy wants to succeed with a codeword that has a prescribed plaintext. It is shown that by applying some
transformation on the A-code it is possible to provides immunity against the above attacks.
A-codes with secrecy are generally more dicult to analyze than cartesian A-codes. Moreover,
the veri cation process for the former is not as ecient. In the case of cartesian A-codes,
veri cation of a received codeword, s:t, amounts to recalculating the tag using the secret key
and the source state s to obtain t0 and comparing it with the received tag t. For an authentic
codeword we have t = t0 . In the case of A-codes with secrecy, when a codeword m is received,
the receiver must try all authentic codewords using his secret key, otherwise there must be an
inverse algorithm that allows the receiver to nd and verify the source state. The former process
is costly and the latter does not exist for a general A-code. For practical reasons, the majority
of research has concentrated on cartesian A-codes.

2.4 Eciency
Authentication systems require secure transmission of key information prior to the communication and hence, similar to secrecy systems, it is desirable to have a small number of key
bits.
Rees and Stinson [60] prove that: for any (M; k; E ) A-code which is 1-fold secure, E  M . For
A-codes with secrecy that provide one-fold security, Stinson [69] shows that:
2
E  Mk2 M
k :

Under similar conditions for cartesian A-codes, Stinson [69] shows that:

E  k(` 1) + 1
where ` = k=M .
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For A-codes with r-fold security, Stinson [71] shows that:
E  Mk((Mk 1)1)((kM r)r) :
An A-code provides perfect authenticity of order r if Pd = k=M . In such codes the probability
of success of the spoofer does not improve with the interception of extra codewords.
The following bound is established by Tombak and Safavi-Naini [75] for codes of the above type:
r

r+1

E  Mkr+1 :
Their bound shows that the provision of perfect authenticity requires log M log k extra key
bits on average for every added order of spoo ng. Hence using the same key for authentication
of more than one message is expensive.
A second measure of eciency, often used for systematic cartesian A-codes, is the size of the
tag space for a xed size of source space and probability of success in substitution. Stinson [72]
shows that, for perfect protection against substitution, the size of key space grows linearly with
the size of the source. Johansson, Kabatianskii and Smeets [37] show that: if P1 > P0 , A-codes
with an exponential (in E ) number of source states can be obtained.

2.5 A-codes and E-codes
An error correcting code provides protection against random channel error The study of error
correcting codes was motivated by Shannon's channel capacity theorem and has been a very
active research area since the early 1950s. Error correcting codes add redundancy to a message
in such a way that a codeword corrupted by the channel noise can be detected and/or corrected.
The main di erence between an A-code and an E-code is that in the former redundancy depends
on a secret key while in the latter it only depends on the message being coded. There exists a
duality between authentication codes and error correcting codes. In the words of Simmons [66],
\ .. one (coding theory) is concerned with clustering the most likely alterations as closely about
the original code as possible and the other (authentication theory) with spreading the optimal
(to the opponent) alterations as uniformly as possible over M."
The relation between E-codes and A-codes is explored in the work of Johansson et al [37], who
show that it is possible to construct E-codes from A-codes and vice-versa. Their work uses
a worst case analysis approach in analyzing the security of A-codes. That is, in the case of
substitution attack, they consider the best chance of success an enemy has when it intercepts all
possible codewords. This contrasts with the information theoretic (or game theory) approach
in which the average success probability of the enemy over all possible intercepted codewords is
calculated.
The work of Johansson et al is especially useful as it allows the well developed body of bounds
and asymptotic results from the theory of error correcting codes to be employed in the context
of authentication codes, to derive upper and lower bounds on the size of the source for A-codes
with given E , T , and P1 .

7

2.6 Authentication with arbiter
In the basic model of authentication discussed above, the enemy is an outsider and we assume
that the transmitter and the receiver are trustworthy. Moreover, because the key is shared
by the transmitter and the receiver, the two principals are cryptographically indistinguishable.
In an attempt to model authentication systems in which the transmitter and the receiver are
distinguished and to remove assumptions about the trustworthiness of the two, Simmons [66]
introduced a fourth principal called the arbiter. The transmitter and receiver have di erent
keys and the arbiter has access to all or part of the key information. The system has a key
distribution phase during which keys satisfying certain conditions are chosen. After that there
is a transmission phase during which the transmitter uses its key to produce a codeword and
nally a dispute phase during which disputes are resolved with the aid of the arbiter. The arbiter
in Simmons' model is active during the transmission phase and is assumed to be trustworthy.
Yung and Desmedt [83] remove this assumption and consider a model in which the arbiter is
only trusted to resolve disputes. Johansson [35] and Kurosawa [39] derive lower bounds on the
probability of deception in such codes. Johansson [36] and Taylor [73] propose constructions.

2.7 Shared generation of authenticators
Many applications require the power to generate an authentic message and/or to verify the
authenticity of a message to be be distributed among a number of principals. An example of
such a situation is multiple signatures in a bank account or court room. Desmedt and Frankel
[25] introduced systems with shared generation of authenticators (SGA-systems), which have
been studied in recent papers by: Safavi-Naini [64], Gehrmann, van Dijk and Smeets, [29], and
Safavi-Naini and Martin [65]. In such systems there is a group P of transmitters created with
an structure that determines authorized subsets of P . Each principal has a secret key which
is used to generate a partial tag. The system has two phases. In the key distribution phase,
a trusted authority generates keys for the transmitters and the receivers and securely delivers
the keys to them. In the communication phase, the trusted authority is not active. When an
authorized group of transmitters wants to construct an authentic codeword, using its key, each
group member generates a partial tag for the source state s which needs to be authenticated,
and sends it to a combiner. The combiner is a xed algorithm with no secret input. It combines
its inputs to produce a tag, t, to be appended to s. The receiver is able to authenticate this
codeword using its secret key. Safavi-Naini and Martin [65] give a general construction for SGAsystems by combining A-codes and secret sharing schemes. Gehrmann et al [29] propose an
ecient construction for SGA-systems, based on maximum rank distance separable codes.

2.8 Multiple authentication
As noted before, in the theory of A-codes the possible attacks by the enemy are limited to impersonation and substitution. This means that the security of the system is only for one message
communication; after that the key must be changed. To extend protection over more than one
message transmission, there exist a number of alternatives. The most obvious ones use A-codes
that provide perfect protection against spoo ng of order `. However, little is known about the
construction of such codes and it is preferable to use A-codes that provide protection against
substitution for more that one message transmission. Vanroose, Smeets and Wan [82] suggest
key strategies in which the communicants change their key after each transmitted codeword,
8

using some pre-speci ed strategy. In this case the key information shared by the communicants
is the sequence of keys to be used for consecutive transmission slots. The resulting bounds
on the probability of deception generalize the bounds given by the following authors: Pei [47],
Rosenbaum [63], and Walker [79].
Another successful approach proposed by Wegman and Carter [80] uses a special class of hash
functions together with a one time pad of random numbers. This construction is discussed in
more detail in Section 5.

3 Computationally secure systems
The study of computationally secure A-systems is relatively informal, cf. Simmons [67]. The
basic framework is similar to unconditionally secure systems. A simple computationally secure
A-code can be obtained by considering S = GF (240) and M = GF (264). We use E to be the
the collection of DES [51] encryption functions and so E = 256. To construct the codeword
corresponding to a source state s, using the key k, we append 24 zeros to s and then use DES
with key k to encrypt s:024, where 024 is the string of 24 zeros.
It is easy to see that the above scheme is an A-code with secrecy. It allows the receiver to easily
verify the authenticity of a received codeword by decrypting a received codeword and checking
the existence of the string of zeros. If an enemy wants to impersonate the transmitter its
chance of success is 2 56, which is the probability of guessing the correct key. For a substitution
attack, the enemy waits to see a transmitted codeword. Then it uses all the keys to decrypt the
codeword and once a decryption of the right form (ending in 24 zeros) is obtained, a possible
key is found. In general there is more than one key with this property. On the average there
are 256  240=264 = 232 pairs (s; k) that produce the same cryptogram and hence the chance of
guessing correctly is 2 32. A better strategy for the enemy is to randomly choose a cryptogram
and send it to the receiver. In this case his chance of success is 2 24, which is better than the
previous case.
The security of computationally secure A-systems weakens very quickly as the enemy intercepts
more cryptograms. Trying all possible keys on ` received cryptograms enables the enemy to
uniquely identify the key, in which case the enemy's chance of success is one.
Computationally secure A-systems without secrecy are obtained by appending an authenticator
to the message which is veri able by the intended receiver. The authenticator can be produced
by a symmetric key algorithm or an asymmetric key algorithm. The former is the subject of the
section on Message Authentication Codes (MAC), while the latter is discussed in the section on
digital signatures.

4 HASHING
In many cryptographic applications, it is necessary to produce a relatively short ngerprint
of a much longer message or electronic document. The ngerprint is also called a digest of
the message. Ideally, a hash function should produce a unique digest of a xed length for a
message of an arbitrary length. Obviously, this is impossible as any hash function is, in fact, a
9

many-to-one mapping. The properties required for secure hashing can be summarized as follows:

 hashing should be a many-to-one function producing a digest which is a complex function

of all bits of the message;
 a hash function should behave as a random function which creates a digest for a given
message by randomly choosing an element from the whole digest space;
 for any pair of messages, it should be computationally dicult to nd a collision; i.e.
distinct messages with the same digest; and
 a hash function should be one-way; i.e. it should be easy to compute the digest of a given
message but dicult to determine the message corresponding to a given digest.
The main requirement of secure hashing is that it should be collision-free in the sense that
nding two colliding messages is computationally intractable. This requirement must hold for
long as well as short messages.

4.1 Strong and weak hash functions
Hash functions can be broadly classi ed into two classes: strong one-way hash functions (also
called collision-free hash functions) and weak one-way hash functions (also known as universal
one-way hash functions). A strong one-way hash function is a function h satisfying the following
conditions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

h can be applied to any message or document M of any size;
h produces a xed size digest;
Given h and M , it is easy to compute the digest h(M ); and
Given h, it is computationally infeasible to nd two distinct messages M1 ; M2 which collide,
i.e. h(M1) = h(M2).

On the other hand, a weak one-way hash function is a function that satis es conditions (1), (2),
(3) and the following:
4'. Given h and a randomly chosen message M , it is computationally intractable to nd another
message M 0 which collides with M , i.e. h(M ) = h(M 0 ).
Strong one-way hash functions are easier to use since there is no precondition on the selection of
the messages. On the other hand, for weak one-way hash functions, there is no guarantee that
a non-random selection of two messages is collision-free. This means that the space of easily
found colliding messages must be small. Otherwise, a random selection of two messages would
produce a collision with a non-negligible probability.
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4.2 Theoretic Constructions
Naor and Yung [44] introduced the concept of a universal one-way hash function (UOWHF) and
suggested a construction based on a one-way permutation. In their construction, they employ
the notion of a universal family of functions with collision accessibility property [80]. The above
functions are de ned as follows.

De nition 1 Suppose G = fg j A ! Bg is a set of functions. G is strongly universalr if given
any r distinct elements a1 ; : : :; ar 2 A, and any r elements b1; : : :; br 2 B , there are jGj/jB j2
functions which take a1 to b1 , a2 to b2 etc. (jGj and jB j denote the cardinality of sets G and B ,
respectively.)
De nition 2 A strongly universalr family of functions G has the collision accessibility property
if it is possible to generate in polynomial time a function g 2 G that satis es the equations:
g (ai) = bi; 1  i  r:
Naor and Yung construct a family of UOWHF's by concatenating any one-way permutation
with a family of strongly universal2 hash functions having the collision accessibility property. In
this construction, the one-way permutation provides the one-wayness of the UOWHF, and the
strongly universal2 family of hash functions provides the mapping to the small length output.
When a function is chosen randomly and uniformly >from the family, the output is distributed
randomly and uniformly over the output space.
Zheng, Matsumoto and Imai [84] de ne a scheme based on the composition of a pairwise independent uniformizer and a strongly universal hash function with a quasi-injection one-way
function.
De Santis and Yung [24] construct hash functions from one-way functions with an almost-known
preimage size. In other words, if an element of the domain is given, then with a polynomial
uncertainty an estimate of the size of the preimage set is easily computable. A regular function
is an example of such a function. (In a regular function, each image of an n-bit input has the
same number of preimages of length n.)
Rompel [62] constructs a UOWHF from any one-way function. His construction is rather elaborate. Brie y, his idea is to transform any one-way function into a UOWHF through a sequence
of complicated procedures. First, the one-way function is transformed into another one-way
function such that for most elements of the domain except for a fraction, it is easy to nd a
collision. >From this, another one-way function is constructed such that for most of the elements
it is hard to nd a collision. Subsequently, a length increasing one-way function is constructed
for which it is hard to nd collisions almost everywhere. Finally, this is turned into a UOWHF
which compresses the input in a way that makes it dicult to nd a collision (cf. Pieprzyk and
Sadeghiyan [49]).

4.3 Hashing based on block ciphers
To minimize the design e ort for cryptographically secure hash functions, the designers of hash
functions tend to base their schemes on existing encryption algorithms. For example, sequential
hashing can be obtained by dividing a given message into blocks and applying an encryption
11

algorithm on the message blocks. The message block length must be the same as the block
length of the encryption algorithm. If the message length is not a multiple of the block length,
then the last block is usually padded with some redundant bits. To provide a randomizing
element, an initial public vector is normally used. The proof of the security of such schemes
relies on the collision freeness of the underlying encryption algorithm.
In the following, let E denote an arbitrary encryption algorithm. Let E (K; M ) denote the
encryption of message M with key K using E ; let IV denote the initial vector.
Rabin [55] shows that any private-key cryptosystem can be used for hashing. Rabin's scheme is
the following. First the message is divided into blocks M1 ; M2; : : : of the same size as the block
length of of the encryption algorithm. In the case of DES, the message is divided into 64-bit
blocks. To hash a message M = (M1; M2; : : :; Mt), the following computations are performed:

H0 = IV
Hi = E (Mi; Hi 1)
i = 1; 2; : : :; t
H (M ) = Ht
where Mi is a message block, Hi are intermediate results of hashing, and H (M ) is the digest.

Although Rabin's scheme is simple and elegant, it is susceptible to the so-called birthday attack
when the size of the hash value is 64 bits.
Winternitz [81] proposes a scheme for the construction of a one-way hash function >from any
block cipher. In any good block cipher, given an input and an output, it should be dicult
to determine the key, but from the the key and the output it should be easy to determine the
input. The scheme uses an operation E  de ned by:

E (K k M ) = E (K; M )  M:
Based on the above scheme, Davies [23] proposes the following hashing algorithm:
H0 = IV
Hi = E (Mi; Hi 1)  Hi 1
i = 1; 2; : : :; t
H (M ) = Ht :
If E (K; M ) is DES, then it may be vulnerable to attacks based on weak keys or a key-collision
search. The meet-in-the-middle attack is thwarted because E (K; M ) is a one-way function.
Merkle [43, 42] proposed hashing schemes based on Winternitz's construction. These schemes
use DES to produce digests of size  128 bits. Their construction follows a general method for
constructing hash algorithms, called the meta method. This is the same as the serial method of
Damgard [22]. The description of the method is as follows. The message is rst divided into
blocks of 106 bits. Each 106-bit block Mi of data is concatenated with the 128-bit block Hi 1 .
The concatenation Xi = Mi k Hi 1 contains 234 bits. Each block Xi is further divided into
halves, Xi1 and Xi2.

H0 = IV
Xi = Hi 1 k Mi
Hi = E (00 k rst 59 bits offE (100 k X1i)g k
rst 59 bits offE (101 k X2i)g) k
E (01 k rst 59 bits offE (110 k X1i)g k
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rst 59 bits offE (111 k X2i)g)

H (M ) = Ht :

In this scheme E  is de ned as in Winternitz's construction. The strings 00, 01, 100, 101, 110,
and 111 above are used to prevent the manipulation of weak keys.

4.4 Hashing functions based on intractable problems
Hashing functions can also be based on one-way functions such as: exponentiation, squaring,
knapsack (cf. Pieprzyk and Sadeghiyan [49]), and discrete logarithm. More recently, a grouptheoretic construction using the SL2 groups has been proposed by Tillich and Zemor [74].
A scheme based on RSA exponentiation as the underlying one-way function is de ned by:

H0 = IV
Hi = (Hi 1  Mi )e mod N
i = 1; 2; : : :; t
H (M ) = Ht
where the modulus N and the exponent e are public. A correcting block attack can be used

to compromise the scheme by appending or inserting a carefully selected last block message to
achieve a desired hash value. To immunize the scheme against this attack, it is necessary to add
redundancy to the message so that the last message block cannot be manipulated (cf. Davies
and Price [23]). To ensure the security of RSA, N should be at least 512 bits in length, making
the implementation of the above scheme very slow.
To improve the performance of the above scheme, the public exponent can be made small. For
example, squaring can be used:

Hi = (Hi 1  Mi )2 mod N:
It is suggested that 64 bits of every message block be set to 0, to avoid a correcting block attack.
An algorithm for hashing based on squaring is proposed in Appendix D of the X.509 recommendations of the CCITT standards on secure message handling. The proposal stipulates that
256 bits of redundancy be distributed over every 256-bit message block by interleaving every
four bits of the message with 1111, so that the total number of bits in each block becomes 512.
The exponentiation algorithm, with exponent two, is then run on the modi ed message in CBC
mode (cf. Pieprzyk and Sadeghiyan [49]). In this scheme, the four most signi cant bits of every
byte in each block are set to 1. Coppersmith [20] shows how to construct colliding messages in
this scheme.
Damgard [22] describes a scheme based on squaring, which maps a block of n bits into a block
of m bits. The scheme is de ned by:

H0 = IV
Hi = extract(00111111 k Hi 1 k Mi )2 mod N
H (M ) = Ht:
In the above scheme, the role of extract is to extract m bits >from the result of the squaring
function. To obtain a secure scheme, m should be suciently large so as to thwart the birthday
attack; this attack will be explained later. Moreover, extract should select bits for which nding
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colliding inputs is dicult. One way to do this is to extract m bits uniformly. However, for
practical reasons, it is better to bind them together in bytes. Another possibility is to extract
every fourth byte. Daemen, Govaerts and Vanderwalle [21] show that this scheme can be broken.
Impagliazzo and Naor [34] propose a hashing function based on the knapsack problem. The
description of the scheme is as follows. Choose at random numbers a1 ; : : :; an in the interval
0; : : :; N , where n indicates the length of the message in bits, and N = 2` 1 where ` < n. A
binary message M = M1 ; M2; : : :; Mn is hashed as
n
X
H (M ) = ai Mi mod 2`:
i=1

Impagliazzo and Naor do not give any concrete parameters for the above scheme, but they have
shown that it is theoretically sound.
Gibson [31] constructs hash functions whose security is conditional upon the diculty of factoring
certain numbers. The hash function is de ned by:

f (x) = ax (mod n);
where n = pq , p and q are large primes, and a is a primitive element of the ring Zn . In Gibson's
hash function n has to suciently large to ensure the diculty of factoring. This constraint

makes the hash function considerably slower than the MD4 algorithm.
Tillich and Zemor [74] propose a hashing scheme where the message digests are given by twodimensional matrices with entries in the binary Galois elds GF (2n ) for 130  n  170. The
hashing functions are parameterized by the irreducible polynomials of degree n, Pn (X ), over
GF (2); their choice is left to the user. Their scheme has several provably secure properties:
detection of local modi cation of text; and resistance to the birthday attack as well as a few
other attacks. Hashing is fast as digests are produced by matrix multiplication in GF (2n ), which
can be parallelized.
Messages (encoded as a binary strings) x1 x2 : : : of arbitrary length are mapped to products of
a selected pair of generators fA; B g of the group SL(2; 2n), as follows:
(
if xi = 0
xi = A
B if x = 1.
i

The resulting product belongs to the (in nite) group SL(2; GF (2)[X ]), where GF (2)[X ] is the
ring of all polynomials over GF (2). The product is then reduced modulo an irreducible polynomial of degree n (Euclidean algorithm), mapping it to an element of SL(2; 2n). The four n-bit
entries of the reduced matrix give the (3n + 1)-bit message digest of x1 x2 : : ::
Charnes and Pieprzyk [15] show that irreducible polynomials which produce collisions for the
SL2 hash functions can be found. Other weaknesses of this scheme are explored in a later paper
available from them [17]. The weak parameters are characterized; they can be computed with
the algorithms given there.
Geiselmann [30] describes an algorithm to produce potential collisions for the SL2 hashing
scheme, independent of the choice of the irreducible polynomials. The complexity of his algorithm is that of the discrete logarithm problem in GF (2n ) or GF (22n ). However, no collisions
in the speci ed range of the hash function have been found using this algorithm. Some pairs of
rather long colliding strings are given by Geiselmann for a toy example of GF (221).
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4.5 Hashing algorithms
Rivest [58] proposes a hashing algorithm called MD4. It is a software oriented scheme which is
especially designed to be fast on 32-bit machines. The algorithm produces a 128-bit output, so it
is not computationally feasible to produce two messages having the same hash value. The scheme
provides di usion and confusion using three boolean functions. The MD5 hashing algorithm is
a strengthened version of MD4 [57]. MD4 has been broken by Dobbertin [26].
HAVAL stands for a one-way hashing algorithm with a variable length of output. It was designed
at the University of Wollongong by Zheng, Pieprzyk and Seberry [85]. It compresses a message
of an arbitrary length into a digest of either 128, 160, 192, 224 or 256 bits. The security level
can be adjusted by selecting 3, 4 or 5 passes. The structure of HAVAL is based on MD4 and
MD5. Unlike MD4 and MD5 whose basic operations are done using functions of three boolean
variables, HAVAL employs ve boolean functions of seven variables (each function serves a single
pass). All functions used in HAVAL are highly nonlinear, 0-1 balanced, linearly inequivalent,
mutually output-uncorrelated and satisfy the Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC). No attack on
HAVAL has been reported so far.
Charnes and Pieprzyk [14] proposed a modi ed version of HAVAL based on ve boolean functions
of ve variables. The resulting hashing algorithm is faster than the ve pass, seven variable
version of the original HAVAL algorithm. They use the same cryptographic criteria which are
used to select the boolean functions in the original scheme. Unlike the seven variable case, the
choice of the boolean functions is fairly restricted in the modi ed setting. Using the shortest
algebraic normal form of the boolean functions as one of the criteria (to maximize the speed
of processing), it is shown that the boolean functions used are optimal. No attacks have been
reported for the ve variable version.

4.6 Attacks
The best method to evaluate a hashing scheme is to see what attacks an adversary can perform to
nd collisions. A good hashing algorithm produces a xed length number which depends on all
the bits of the message. It is generally assumed that the adversary knows the hashing algorithm.
In a conservative approach, it is assumed that the adversary can perform an adaptive chosen
message attack, where it may choose messages, ask for their digests, and try to compute colliding
messages. There are several methods for using such pairs to attack a hashing scheme and to
calculate colliding messages. Some methods are quite general and can be applied against any
hashing scheme; for example, the so-called birthday attack. Other methods are applicable only
to speci c hashing schemes. Some attacks can be used against a wide range of hash functions.
For example, the so-called meet-in-the-middle attack is applicable to any scheme that uses some
sort of block chaining in its structure. As another example, the so-called correcting block attack
is applicable mainly to hash functions based on modular arithmetic.

Birthday Attack

The idea behind this attack originates from a famous problem from probability theory, called
the birthday paradox. The paradox can be stated as follows. What is the minimum number of
pupils in a classroom so the probability that at least two pupils have the same birthday is greater
than 0:5? The answer to this question is 23, which is much smaller than the value suggested by
intuition. The justi cation for the paradox is as follows. Suppose that the pupils are entering
the classroom one at a time. The probability that the birthday of the rst pupil falls on a
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1
speci c day of the year is equal to 365
. The probability that the birthday of the second pupil
1
. If the birthdays of the rst two pupils are
is not the same as the rst one is equal to 1 365
di erent, the probability that the birthday of the third pupil is di erent from the rst one and
2
the second one is equal to 1 365
. Consequently, the probability that t students have di erent
1
2
) : : : (1 t3651 ), and the probability that at least two of
birthdays is equal to (1 365 )(1 365
them have the same birthday is
1 )(1 2 ) : : : (1 t 1 ):
P = 1 (1 365
365
365
It can be easily computed that for t  23, this probability is greater than 0:5.
The birthday paradox can be employed for attacking hash functions. Suppose that the number
of bits of the hash value is n. An adversary generates r1 variations of a bogus message and
r2 variations of a genuine message. The probability of nding a bogus message and a genuine
message that hash to the same digest is

P 1 e

r1 r2
2n

where r2  1 (see Ohta and Koyama [46]). When r1 = r2 = 2 , the above probability is  0:63.
Therefore any hashing algorithm which produces digests of length around 64 bits is insecure,
since the time complexity function for the birthday attack is  232. It is usually recommended
that the hash value should be around 128 bits to thwart the birthday attack.
This method of attack does not take advantage of the structural properties of the hash scheme
or its algebraic weaknesses. It applies to any hash scheme. In addition, it is assumed that the
hash scheme assigns to a message a value which is chosen with a uniform probability among all
the possible hash values. Note that if the structure is weak or has certain algebraic properties,
the digests do not have a uniform probability distribution. In such cases it may be possible to
nd colliding messages with a better probability and fewer message-digest pairs.
n

2

Meet-in-the-middle attack

This is a variation of the birthday attack, but instead of comparing the digests, the intermediate
results in the chain are compared. The attack can be made against schemes which employ some
sort of block chaining in their structure. In contrast to birthday attack, a meet-in-the-middle
attack enables an attacker to construct a bogus message with a desired digest. In this attack
the message is divided into two parts. The attacker generates r1 variations on the rst part of a
bogus message. He starts from the initial value and goes forward to the intermediate stage. He
also generates r2 variations on the second part of the bogus message. He starts from the desired
false digest and goes backwards to the intermediate stage. The probability of a match in the
intermediate stage is the same as the probability of success in the birthday attack.

Correcting-block attack

In a correcting block attack, a bogus message is concatenated with a block to produce a corrected
digest of the desired value. This attack is often applied to the last block and is called correcting
last block attack, although it can be applied to other blocks as well. Hash functions based on
modular arithmetic are especially sensitive to the correcting last block attack (cf. Preneel [50]).
The introduction of redundancy into the message in these schemes makes nding a correcting
block with the necessary redundancy dicult. However, it makes the scheme less ecient. The
diculty of nding a correcting block depends on the nature of the redundancy introduced. For
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example, Coppersmith [20] shows that the redundancy built into the CCITT hashing scheme
based on modular squaring results in an insecure scheme.
Biham and Shamir [11] have developed a method for attacking block ciphers, known as di erential cryptanalysis. This is a general method for attacking cryptographic algorithms, including
hashing schemes. For example, Berson [8] has applied di erential cryptanalysis to MD5.

5 MAC
Message authentication codes provide message integrity and are one of the most important
security primitives in current distributed information systems. A Message Authentication Code
(MAC) is a symmetric key cryptographic primitive that consists of two algorithms. A MAC
generation algorithm, G = fGk : k = 1; : : :; N g takes an arbitrary message, s, from a given
collection S of messages and produces a tag, t = Gk (s), which is appended to the message to
produce an authentic message, m = (s:t). A MAC veri cation algorithm, V = fVk (:) : k =
1; : : :; N g, takes authenticated messages of the form (s:t), and produces a true or false value,
depending on whether the message is authentic. The security of a MAC depends on the best
chance that an active spoofer has to successfully substitute a received message (s:Gk (s)) for
a fraudulent one, m0 = (s0; t), so that Vk (m0) produces a true result. In MAC systems, the
communicants share a secret key, and are therefore not distinguishable cryptographically.
The security of MACs can be studied from the point of view of unconditional or computational
security.
Unconditionally secure MACs are equivalent to cartesian authentication codes. However, in
MAC systems only multiple communications are of interest. In Section 2, A-codes that provide
protection for multiple transmissions were discussed. In the next section, we present a construction for a MAC which has been the basis of all the recent MAC constructions and has a number
of important properties. It is provably secure; the number of key bits required is asymptotically
minimal; and it has a fast implementation.
Computationally secure MACs have arisen >from the needs of the banking community, cf. Preneel, Chaum, Fumy, Jansen, Landrock and Roelofsen [52]. They are also studied under other
names, such as keyed hash functions and keying hash functions. In Section 5.3, we review the
main properties and constructions of such MACs.

5.1 Unconditionally secure MACs
When the enemy has unlimited computational resources, attacks against MAC systems and the
analysis of security are similar to that of cartesian A-codes. The enemy observes n codewords of
the form si :ti , i = 1; : : :; n, in the channel and attempts to construct a fraudulent codeword s:t
which is accepted by the receiver. (This is the same as spoo ng of order n in an A-code.) If the
communicants want to limit the enemy's chance of success to p after n message transmissions,
the number of authentication functions (number of keys) must be greater than a lower bound
which depends on p. If the enemy's chance of success in spoo ng of order i; i = 1; : : :; n, is pi ,
then at least 1=p1p2    pn keys are required, see Fak [28], Wegman and Carter [80] for a proof
of this. For pi = p; i = 1; : : :; n, the required number of key bits is n log2 p. That is, for every
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message, log2 p key bits are required. This is the absolute minimum for the required number
of key bits.
Perfect protection is obtained when the enemy's best strategy is a random choice of a tag and
appending it to the message; this strategy succeeds with probability p = 2 k , if the size of the
tag is k bits. In this case the number of required key bits for every extra message is k.
Wegman and Carter [80] give a general construction for unconditionally secure MACs that can
be used for providing protection for an arbitrary number of messages.
Their construction uses universal classes of hash functions. Traditionally, a hash function is used
to achieve fast average performance over all inputs in varied applications, such as databases. By
using a universal class of hash functions it is possible to achieve provable average performance
without restricting the input distribution.
Let h : A ! B be a hash function mapping the elements of a set A to a set B . A strongly
universaln class of hash function is a class of hash functions with the property that for n distinct
elements a1; : : :; an of A and n distinct elements b1; : : :; bn of B , exactly jH j=(bn) functions
map ai to bi , for i = 1; : : :; n. Strongly universaln hash functions give perfect protection for
multiple messages as follows. The transmitter and the receiver use a publicly known class of
strongly universaln hash functions, and a shared secret key determines a particular member of
the class that they will use for their communication. Stinson [70] shows that a class of strongly
universal2 that maps a set of a elements to a set of b elements is equivalent to an orthogonal
array OA (2; a; b) with  = jH j=b2. Similar results can be proved for strongly universaln classes
of hash functions. Because of this equivalence, universaln hash functions are not a practically
attractive solution. In particular, this proposal is limited by the constraints of constructing
orthogonal arrays with arbitrary parameters. For a survey of known results on orthogonal
arrays, see Beth, Jungnickel and Lenz [10].

5.2 Wegman and Carter construction
Wegman and Carter show that, instead of strongly universaln one can always use a strongly
universal2 family of hash functions, together with a one time pad of random numbers. The
system works as follows. Let B denote the set of tags consisting of the sequences of k bit strings.
Let H denote a strongly universal2 class of hash functions mapping S to B . Two communicants
share a key that speci es a function h 2 H together with a pad containing k-bit random numbers.
The tag for the j th message sj is h(sj )  rj , where rj is the j th number on the pad. It can be
proved that this system limits the enemy's chance of success to 2 k as long as the pad is random
and not used repeatedly. The system requires nk + K bits of key, where K is the number of bits
required to specify an element of H, n is the number of messages to be authenticated, and k is
the size of the tags.
This construction has a number of remarkable properties. Firstly, for large n the key requirement
for the system approaches the theoretical minimum of k bits per message. This is because for
large n the number of key bits is e ectively determined by nk. Secondly, the construction of MAC
with provable security for multiple communications is e ectively reduced to the construction of a
better studied primitive, that is, strongly universal2 class of hash functions. Finally, by replacing
the one-time pad with a pseudorandom sequence generator, unconditional security is replaced
by computational security.
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Wegman and Carter's important observation is as follows. By not insisting on the minimum
value for the probability of success in spoo ng of order one, i.e. allowing p1 > 1=k, it is possible
to reduce the number of functions, and thus the required number of keys. This observation leads
to the notion of almost strongly universal2 class.
An -almost universal2 (or -AU2 ) class of hash functions has the following property. For any
pair x; y 2 A; x 6= y , the number of hash functions h with h(x) = h(y ) is at most equal to .
The -almost strongly-universal2 (or -ASU2 ) hash functions have the added property that for
any x 2 A; y 2 B the number of functions with h(x) = y is jH j=jB j. Using an -almost stronglyuniversal2 class of functions in the Wegman and Carter construction results in MAC systems
for which the probability of success for an intruder is . Such MACs are called -otp-secure, see
Krawczyk [38].
Stinson [72] gives several methods for combining hash functions of class AU2 and ASU2 . The
following theorem shows that an -ASU2 class can be constructed >from an -AU2 class.

Theorem 3 [72] Suppose H is an  -AU class of hash functions >from A to B , and suppose
1

1

2

1

1

H2 is an 2-ASU2 class of hash functions from B1 to B2. Then there exists an -ASU2 class H
of hash functions from A1 to B2 , where  = 1 + 2 and jH j = jH1j  jH2j.

This theorem further reduces the construction of MACs with provable security to the construction of -AU2 class of hash functions.
Several constructions for -ASU2 hash functions are given by Stinson [72]. Johansson et al
[37] establish relationships between ASU2 hash functions and error correcting codes. They use
geometric error correcting codes to construct new classes of -ASU2 hash function of smaller
size. This reduces the key size.
Krawczyk [38] shows that in the Wegman-Carter construction, -ASU2 hash functions can be
replaced with a less demanding class of hash functions, called -otp-secure. The de nition of
this class di ers from other classes of hash functions, in that it is directly related to MAC
constructions and their security; in particular, to the Wegman-Carter construction.
Let s 2 S denote a message that is to be authenticated by a k bit tag h(s)  r, constructed by
Wegman and Carter's method. An enemy succeeds in a spoo ng attack if he can nd s0 6= s,
t0 = h(s0 )  r, assuming that he knows H but does not know h and r. A class H of hash
functions is -otp-secure if for any message no adversary succeeds in the above attack scenario
with probability greater than .

Theorem 4 [38] A necessary and sucient condition for a family H of hash functions to be
-otp-secure is that

8a 6= a ; c; Prh (h(a )  h(a ) = c)  :
1

2

1

2

The need for high speed MACs has increased with the progress in high speed data communication. A successful approach to the construction of such MACs uses hash function families in
which the message is hashed by multiplying it by a binary matrix. Because hashing is achieved
with exclusive-or operations, it can be eciently implemented in software. An obvious candidate
for such a class of hash functions, originally proposed by Wegman and Carter [13, 80], is the
set of linear transformations from A to B . It is shown that this forms an -AU2 class of hash
functions. However the size of the key { the number of entries in the matrix { is too large,
19

and too many operations are required for hashing. Later proposals by Krawczyk [38] and by
Rogaway [61] are aimed at alleviating these problems, and have a fast software implementation.
The former uses Topelitz matrices [38], while the latter uses binary matrices with only three
ones per column. In both cases, the resulting family is -AU2 .
The design of a complete MAC usually involves a number of hash functions which are combined
by methods, similar to those proposed by Stinson [72]. The role of some of the hash functions is
to produce high compression (small b), while others produce the desired spread and uniformity
(see Rogaway [61]).
Reducing the key size of the hash function is especially important in practical applications,
because the one-time pad is replaced by the output of a pseudorandom generator with a short
key (of the order of 128 bits). Hence it is desirable to have the key size of the hash function of
similar order.

5.3 Computational security
In the computationally secure approach, protection is achieved because excessive computation
is required for a successful forgery. Although a hash value can be used as a checksum to detect
random changes in the data, a secret key must be used to provide protection against active
tampering. Methods for constructing MACs from hash functions have traditionally followed one
of the following approaches: the so-called hash-then-encrypt and keying a hash function.

Hash-then-encrypt

To construct a MAC for a message x with this method, the hash value of x is calculated and
the result is encrypted using an encryption algorithm. This is similar to signature generation,
where a public key algorithm is replaced by a private key encryption function.
There are a number of drawbacks to this method. First, the overall scheme is slow. This
is because the two primitives used in the construction, i.e. the cryptographic hash functions
and encryption functions, are designed for other purposes and have extra security properties
which are not strictly required in the construction. Although this construction can produce
a secure MAC, the speed of the MAC is bounded by the speed of its constituent algorithms.
For example, cryptographic hash functions are designed to be one-way. It is not clear whether
this is a required property in the hash-then-encrypt construction, where the output of the hash
function is encrypted and one-wayness is e ectively obtained through the diculty of nding
the plaintext from the ciphertext.
A serious shortcoming of this method is that existing export restrictions, which usually apply
to encryption functions, are inherited by MACs constructed using this method.

Keying a hash function

In the second approach a secret key is incorporated into a hashing algorithm. This operation is
sometimes called keying a hash function (see Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [5]). This method is
attractive, because of the availability of hashing algorithms and their relative speed in software
implementation; these algorithms are not subject to export restrictions.
Although this scheme can be implemented more eciently in software than the previous scheme,
the objection to the super uous properties of the hash functions remains.
The keying method depends on the structure of the hash function. Tsudik [78] proposes three
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methods of incorporating the key into the data. In the secret pre x method, Gk (s) = H (kks),
while in the secret sux, we have Gk (s) = H (skk). Finally, the envelope method combines the
previous two methods with Gk (s) = H (k1kskk2 ) and k = k1 kk2.
Instead of including the key into the data, the key information can be included into the hashing
algorithm. In iterative hash functions such as MD5 and SHA, the key can be incorporated into
the initial vector, compression function or into the output transformation.
There have also been some attempts at de ning and constructing secure keyed hash functions
as independent primitives, namely by Berson, Gong and Lomas [9] and Bakhtiari, Safavi-Naini
and Pieprzyk [1]. The former propose a set of criteria for secure keyed hash functions and give
constructions using one-way hash functions. The latter argue that the suggested criteria for
security is in most cases excessive; relaxing these allows constructions of more ecient secure
keyed hash functions. Bakhtiari et al also give a design of a keyed hash function from scratch.
Their design is based mostly on intuitive principles and lacks a rigorous proof of security. A
similar approach is taken in the design of MDx-MAC by Preneel and van Oorschot [53], which
is a scheme for constructing a MAC from an MD5-type hash function. It is conjectured that if
MDx is a secure hash function, then MDx-MAC is a secure MAC.

5.3.1 Security analysis of computationally secure MACs
The security analysis of computational secure MACs has followed two di erent approaches. In
the rst approach, the security assessment is based on an analysis of some possible attacks. In
the second approach, a security model is developed and used to examine the proposed MAC.

Security analysis through attacks

Consider a MAC algorithm that produces MACs of length m using a k bit key. In general
an attack might result in a successful forgery, or in the recovery of the key. According to the
classi cation given by Preneel and van Oorschot [54], a forgery in a MAC can be either existential
{ the opponent can construct a valid message and MAC without the knowledge of the key pair,
or selective { the opponent can determine the MAC for a message of his choice. Protection
against the former type of attack imposes more stringent conditions than the latter type of
attack. A forgery is veri able if the attacker can determine with a high probability whether the
attack is successful. In a chosen text attack the attacker is given the MACs for the messages of
his own choice. In an adaptive attack the attacker chooses text for which he can see the result
of his previous request before forming his next request. In a key recovery attack the aim of the
attacker is to nd the key. If the attacker is successful, he can perform selective forgery on any
message of his choice and the security of the system is totally compromised.
For an ideal MAC any method to nd the key is as expensive as an exhaustive search of O(2k )
operations. If m < k, the attacker may randomly choose the MAC for a message with the
probability of success equal to 1=2m . However, in this attack the attacker cannot verify whether
his attack has been successful.
The complexity of various attacks is discussed by several authors: Tsudik [78], Bakhtiari et al
[2], Bellare et al [6]. Preneel and van Oorschot [53, 54] propose constructions resistant to such
attacks. Some attacks can be applied to all MACs obtained using a speci c construction method
while other attacks are limited to particular instances of the method.
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5.3.2 Formal security analysis
The main attempts at formalizing the security analysis of computationally secure MACs are
due to Bellare et al [5], and Bellare and Rogaway [7]. In both papers, an attack model is rstly
carefully de ned and the security of a MAC with respect to that model is considered. Bellare
et al [5] use their model to prove the security of a generic construction based on pseudorandom
functions, while Bellare and Rogaway [7] use their model to prove the security of a generic
construction based on hash functions.

MAC from pseudorandom functions

The formal de nition of security given by Bellare et al [7] assumes that the enemy can ask the
transmitter to construct tags for messages of his choice, and also ask the receiver to verify chosen
message and tag pairs. The number of these requests is limited, and a limited time t can be
spent on the attack. Security of the MAC is expressed as an upper bound on the enemy's chance
of succeeding in its best attack.
The construction proposed by Bellare et al applies to any pseudorandom function. Their proposal, called XOR-MAC, basically breaks a message into blocks. For each block the output of the
pseudorandom function is calculated, and the outputs are nally XORed. Two schemes based
on this approach are proposed: the randomized XOR scheme and the counter based scheme.
The pseudorandom function used in the above construction can be an encryption function, like
DES, or a hash function, like MD5. It is proved that the counter based scheme is more secure
than the randomized scheme, and if DES is used, both schemes are more secure than CBC MAC.
Some of the desirable features of this construction are parallelizability and incrementality. The
former means that message blocks can be fed into the pseudorandom function in parallel. The
latter refers to the feature of calculating incrementally the value of the MAC for a message s0
which di ers from s in only a few blocks.

MAC from hash functions
The model used by Bellare and Rogaway [5] is similar to the above one. The enemy can obtain
information by asking queries; however, in this case queries are only addressed to the transmitter.
A family of functions fFk g is (, t, q, L)-secure MAC [6] if any adversary that is not given the
key k, is limited to spend total time t, and sees the values of the function Fk computed on q
messages s1 ; s2 ;    ; sq of its choice, each of length at most L, cannot nd a message and tag
pair (s; t), s 6= si ; i = 1; : : :q , such that t = Fk (s) with probability better that .
Two general constructions for MAC from hash functions, the so-called NMAC (the Nested
construction) and HMAC (the Hash based MAC) are given and their security is formally proved.

Theorem 5 [5] If the keyed compression function f is a (f , t, q, L)-secure MAC and the keyed
iterated hash function F is (F , t, q, L)-weakly collision-resistant then the NMAC is (f + F ,
t, q, L)-secure MAC.
Weak collision-resistance is a much weaker notion than the collision resistance of (unkeyed) hash
functions, because the enemy does not know the secret key and nding collision is much more
dicult in this case. More precisely, a family of keyed hash functions fFk g is (, t, q, L)-weakly
collision-resistant if any adversary that is not given the key k, is limited to spend total time t,
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and sees the values of the function Fk computed on q messages m1 ; m2 ; : : :; mq of its choice, each
of length at most L, cannot nd messages m and m0 for which Fk (m) = Fk (m0) with probability
better that .
With some extra assumptions similar results are proved for the HMAC construction.
A related construction is the collisionful keyed hash function proposed by Gong [33]. In his
construction, the collisions are selectable and the resulting function is claimed to provide security
against password guessing attacks. Bakhtiari, Safavi-Naini and Pieprzyk [3], [4] explore the
security of Gong's function and a key exchange protocol based on collisionful hash functions.

5.4 Applications
The main application of a MAC is to provide protection against active spoo ng (see Wegman and
Carter [13]). This is particularly important in open distributed systems such as the Internet.
Other applications include secure password checking and software protection. MACs can be
used to construct encryption functions and have been used in authentication protocols in place
of encryption functions (cf. Bird, Gopal, Herzberg, Janson, Kutten, Molva and Yung [12]).
An important advantage of MAC functions is that they are not subject to export restrictions.
Other applications of MAC functions are to protect software against viruses (cf. Radai [56]),
or to protect computer les against tampering. Integrity checking is an important service in a
computer operating system which can be automated with software tools.

6 DIGITAL SIGNATURES
Digital signatures are meant to be electronic equivalents of handwritten signatures. They should
preserve the main features of handwritten signatures. Obviously, it is desirable that digital
signatures be as legally binding as handwritten ones. There are three elements in every signature:
the signer, the document, and the time of signing.
In most cases, the document already includes a timestamp. A digital signature must re ect both
the content of the document and the identity of the signer. The signer is uniquely identi ed by
its secret key. In particular, we require the signature to be:






unique { a given signature re ects the document and can be generated by the signer only;
unforgeable { it must be computationally intractable for an opponent to forge the signature;
easy to generate by the signer and easy to verify by recipients; and
impossible to deny by the signer (non-repudiation).

A digital signature di ers from a handwritten signature in that it is not physically attached
to the document on a piece of paper. Digital signatures have to be related both to the signer
and the document by a cryptographic algorithm. Signatures can be veri ed by any potential
recipient. Therefore, the veri cation algorithm must be public. Signature veri cation succeeds
only when the signer and document match the signature.
There are two general classes of signature schemes:
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 one-time signature schemes, and
 multiple signature schemes.
One-time signature schemes can be used to sign only one message. To sign a second message,
the signature scheme has to be re-initialized; however, any signature can be veri ed repeatedly.
Multiple signature schemes can be used to sign several messages without the necessity to reinitialize the signature scheme.
In practice, a signature scheme is required to provide a relatively short signature for a document
of an arbitrary length. We sign the document by generating a signature for its digest. The
hashing employed to produce the digest must be secure and collision free.

6.1 One-time signature schemes
This class of signature schemes can be implemented using any one-way function. These schemes
were rst developed using private key cryptosystems. We follow the original notation. An
encryption algorithm is used as a one-way function. To set up the signature scheme, the signer
chooses a one-way function (encryption algorithm). The signer selects an index k (secret key)
randomly and uniformly from the set of keys, K . The index determines an instance of the
one-way function, i.e., Ek : n ! n where  = f0; 1g; it is known only by the signer. Note
that n has to be large enough to avoid birthday attacks.

Lamport scheme

Lamport's scheme [40] generates signatures for n-bit messages. To sign a message, the signer
rst chooses randomly n key pairs:
(K10; K11); (K20; K21); : : :; (Kn0; Kn1):
(1)
The pairs of keys are kept secret and are known to the signer only. Next, the signer creates two
sequences, S and R:
S = f(S10; S11); (S20; S21); : : :; (Sn0; Sn1)g;
R = f(R10; R11); (R20; R21); : : :; (Rn0; Rn1)g:
(2)
The elements of S are selected randomly and the elements of R are cryptograms of S so
Rij = EK (Sij ) for i = 1; : : :; n and j = 0; 1;
(3)
where EK is the encryption function of the selected symmetric cryptosystem. S and R are stored
in a read-only public register; they are known by the receivers.
The signature of a n-bit message M = (m1; : : :; mn ), mi 2 f0; 1g for i = 1; : : :; n, is a sequence
of cryptographic keys:
S (M ) = fK1i ; K2i ; : : :; Kni g
(4)
where ij = 0 if mj = 0; otherwise ij = 1, j = 1; : : :; n. A receiver validates the signature S (M )
by verifying whether suitable pairs of S and R match each other for known keys.
ij

1

2

Rabin scheme

n

In Rabin's scheme [55], a signer begins the construction of the signature by generating 2r keys
at random:
K1; K2; : : :; K2r:
(5)
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The parameter r is determined by the security requirements. The Ki are secret and known only
to the signer. Next, the signer creates two sequences which are needed by the recipients to verify
the signature. The rst sequence,
S = fS1; S2; : : :; S2rg
comprises of binary blocks chosen at random by the signer. The second,
R = fR1; R2; : : :; R2rg
is created using the sequence S , Ri = EK (Si ) for i = 1; : : :; 2r: S and R are stored in a read-only
public register.
The signature is generated using the following steps. The message to be signed M is enciphered
under keys K1; : : :; K2r. The cryptograms:
i

EK (M ); : : :; EK (M )
(6)
form the signature S (M ). The pair (S (M ); M ) is sent to the receivers.
To verify the signature, a receiver selects randomly a 2r-bit sequence  of r-ones and r-zeros.
A copy of  is forwarded to the signer. Using  , the signer forms an r-element subset of the
keys with the property that Ki belongs to the subset if and only if the i-th element of the 2r-bit
sequence is `1'; i = 1; : : :; 2r. The subset of keys is then communicated to the receiver. To
verify the key subset, the receiver generates and compares r suitable cryptograms of S with the
1

2r

originals kept in the public register.

Matyas-Meyer scheme

Matyas and Meyer [41] propose a signature scheme based on the DES algorithm. However, any
one-way function can be used in the scheme.
The signer rst selects a random matrix U = [ui;j ] i = 1; : : :; 30, j = 1; : : :; 31 and ui;j 2 n .
Using U , a 31  31 matrix KEY = [ki;j ] is constructed for ki;j 2 n . The rst row of KEY
matrix is chosen at random, the other rows are:
ki+1;j = Ek (ui;j )
for i = 1; : : :; 30 and j = 1; : : :; 31. Finally, the signer installs in a public registry the matrix U
and the vector (k31;1; : : :; k31;31) (the last row of KEY ).
To sign a message m 2 n the cryptograms
ci = Ek (m) for i = 1; : : :; 31
i;j

31;i

are computed. The cryptograms are considered as integers and ordered according to their values
so ci < ci <    < ci . The signature of m is the sequence of keys
SGk (m) = (ki ;1 ; ki ;2 ; : : :; ki ;31):
1

2

31

1

2

31

The veri er takes the message m, recreates the cryptograms ci and orders them in increasing
order. Next, the signature-keys are put into the `empty' matrix KEY in the entries indicated by
the ordered sequence of ci 's. The veri er then repeats the signer's steps and computes all keys
below the keys of the signature. The signature is accepted if the last row of KEY is identical
to the row stored in the registry.
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6.2 Signature schemes based on public-key cryptosystems
RSA signature scheme

First, a signer sets up the RSA system [59] with the modulus N = p  q , where the two primes
p and q are xed. Next a random decryption key d 2 ZN is chosen; the encryption key e is

e  d  1 (mod (p 1; q 1)):
The signer publishes both the modulus N and the decryption key d.
Given a message M 2 ZN , the signature generated by the signer is

S  M e (mod N ):
Since the decryption key is public, anyone can verify whether

M  S d (mod N ):
The signature is considered to be valid if this congruence is satis ed. RSA signatures are subject
to various attacks which exploit the commutativity of exponentiation.

ElGamal signature scheme

The signature scheme due to ElGamal [27] is based on the discrete logarithm problem. The signer
chooses a nite eld GF (p) for a suciently large prime p. A primitive element g 2 GF (p) and
a random integer r 2 GF (p) are xed. Next the signer computes

K  gr (mod p)
and announces K , g and p. To sign a message M 2 GF (p), the signer selects a random integer
R 2 GF (p) such that gcd (R; p 1) = 1 and calculates

X  g R (mod p):
Using this data following congruence is solved

M  r  X + R  Y (mod p 1)
for Y using Euclid's algorithm. The signature of M is the triple (M; X; Y ). Note that r and R
are kept secret by the signer. The recipient of the signed message forms

A  K X X Y (mod p)
and accepts the message M as authentic if A  g M (mod p). It is worth noting that knowledge
of the pair (X; Y ), does not reveal the message M . As a matter of fact, there are many pairs
matching the message { for every pair (r; R) there is a pair (X; Y ).
Since discrete exponent systems can be based on any cyclic group, the ElGamal signature scheme
can be extended to this setting. A modi cation of ElGamal's signature was proposed as a Digital
Signature Standard (DSS) in 1991 ([45]).
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6.3 Special signatures
Sometimes additional conditions are imposed upon digital signatures. Blind signatures are
useful in situations where the message to be signed should not be revealed to the signer. Unlike
typical digital signatures, the undeniable versions require the participation of the signer in order
to verify the signature. Fail-stop signatures are used whenever there is a need for protection
against a very powerful adversary. As these signatures require interactions amongst the parties
involved, the signatures are sometimes called signature protocols.

Blind Signatures

The concept of blind signatures was introduced by Chaum [18]. They are applicable to situations
where the holder of a message M needs to get M signed by a signer (which could be a public
registry) without revealing the message. This can be done with the following steps.






The holder of the message rst encrypts it.
The holder sends a cryptogram of the message to the signer.
The signer generates the signature for the cryptogram and sends it back to the holder.
The holder decodes the encryption and obtains the signature of the message.

This scheme works if the encryption and signature operations commute, for example, the RSA
scheme can be used to implement blind signatures.
Assume that the signer has set up a RSA signature scheme with modulus N and public decryption key d. The holder of the message M selects at random an integer k 2 ZN and computes
the cryptogram
C  M  kd (mod N ):
The cryptogram C is now sent to the signer who computes the blind signature

SC  (M  kd )e (mod N ):
The blind signature SC is returned to the holder who computes the signature for M as follows

SM  SC  k 1  M e (mod N ):
It is not necessary to have special signature schemes to generate blind signatures. It is enough
for the holder of the message to use a secure hash function h(). To get a (blind) signature from
the signer, the holder rst compresses the message M using h(). The digest D = h(M ) is sent
to the signer. After signing the digest, the signature SGk (D) is communicated to the holder
who attaches the message M to the signature SGk (D). Note that the signer cannot recover the
message M from the digest, since h() is a one-way hash function. Also the holder cannot cheat
by attaching a `false' message unless collisions for the hash function can be found.

Undeniable Signatures

The concept of undeniable signatures is due to Chaum and van Antwerpen [19]. The characteristic feature of undeniable signatures is that signatures cannot be veri ed without the co-operation
of the signer. Assume we have selected a large prime p and a primitive element g 2 GF (p).
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Both p and g are public. The signer randomly selects its secret k 2 GF (p) and announces g k
(mod p). For a message M , the signer creates the signature
S  M k (mod p):
Veri cation needs the co-operation of the veri er and signer, and proceeds as follows.

 The veri er selects two random numbers a; b 2 GF (p) and sends C  S a(gk)b (mod p)

to the signer.
 The signer computes k 1 such that k  k 1  1 (mod p 1) and returns d = C k 
M a  gb (mod p) to the veri er.
 The veri er accepts or rejects the signature as genuine depending on whether d  M a  gb
(mod p).
1

There are two possible ways in which a veri cation can fail. Either the signer has tried to
disavow a genuine signature or the signature is indeed false. The rst possibility is prevented
by incorporating a disavowal protocol. The protocol requires two runs for veri cation. In the
rst run, the veri er randomly selects two integers a1 ; b1 2 GF (p) and sends C1  S a (g k )b
(mod p) to the signer. The signer returns d1 = C1k to the veri er. The veri er checks whether
d1 6= M a  gb (mod p):
If the congruence is not satis ed, the veri er repeats the process using a di erent pair a2 ; b2 2
GF (p). The veri er concludes that S is a forgery if and only if
(d1g b )a  (d2g b )a (mod p);
otherwise, the signer is cheating.
1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

1

Fail-Stop Signatures

The concept of fail-stop signatures was introduced by P tzmann and Waidner [48]. Fail-stop
signatures protect signatures against a powerful adversary. As usual the signature is produced
by a signer who holds a particular secret key. There are, however, many other keys which can be
used to produce the same signature and which thus work with the original public key. There is
a high probability that the key chosen by the adversary di ers from the key held by the signer.
Fail-stop signatures provide signing and veri cation algorithms as well as an algorithm to detect
forgery.
Let k be a secret key known to the signer only and K be the public key. The signature on
a message M is denoted as s = SGk (M ). A fail-stop signature must satisfy the following
conditions:

 An opponent with unlimited computational power can forge a signature with a negligible
probability. More precisely, an opponent who knows the pair (s = SGk (M ); M ) and the
signer's public key K , can create a collection of all keys Ks;M such that k 2 Ks;M if and
only if s = SGk (M ) = SGk (M ). The size of Ks;M has to increase exponentially as a
function of the security parameter n. Not knowing the secret k, the opponent can only
randomly chose an element from Ks;M . Let this element be k . If the opponent signs
another message M  =
6 M , it is a requirement that s = SGk (M ) =6 SGk (M ) with a
probability close to one.
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 There is a polynomial-time algorithm which produces a proof of forgery as output, when
given the following inputs: a secret key k, a public key K , a message M , a valid signature
s, and a forged signature s .
 A signer with polynomially bounded computing power cannot construct a valid signature
which it can later deny by proving it to be a forgery.

Clearly, after the signer has provided a proof of forgery, the scheme is compromised and is no
longer used. This is why it is called `fail-stop'.

7 Research Issues and Summary
In this chapter we discussed: Authentication, Hashing, Message Authentication Codes (MACs),
and Digital Signatures. We have presented the fundamental ideas underlying each topic and
indicated the current research developments in these topics. This is re ected in our bibliography.
We shall now summarize the topics covered in this chapter.
Authentication deals with the problem of providing assurance to a receiver that a communicated
message originates from a particular transmitter, and that the received message has the same
content as the transmitted message. A typical and widely used application of authentication
occurs in computer networks. Here the problem is to provide a protocol to establish the identity
of two parties wishing to communicate or make transactions via the network. Motivated by such
applications, the theory of authentication codes has developed into a mature area of research,
drawing from several areas of mathematics.
Hashing algorithms provide a relatively short digest of a much longer input. Hashing must satisfy
the critical requirement that the digests of two distinct messages are distinct. A widely used
type of hashing functions are constructed from block encryption ciphers. They have numerous
applications in cryptology. Algebraic methods have also been proposed as a source of good
hashing functions. These o er some provable security properties.
Message Authentication Codes or (MACs), are symmetric key primitives providing message integrity against active spoo ng, by appending a cryptographic checksum to a message which is
veri able only by the intended recipient of the message. Message authentication is one of the
most important ways of ensuring the integrity of information which is communicated by electronic means. This is especially relevant in the rapidly developing sphere of electronic commerce.
Digital signatures are the electronic equivalents of handwritten signatures. They are designed
so as to preserve the essential features of handwritten signatures. They can be used to sign
electronic documents and have potential application in legal contexts.

8 De ning Terms
authentication : is one of the main two goals of cryptography (the other is secrecy). An
authentication system ensures that massages which are transmitted over a communication
channel are authentic.
cryptology: is the art/science of design and analysis of cryptographic systems.
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digital signatures : an asymmetric cryptographic primitive which is the digital counterpart

of a signature and links a document to a unique person.
encryption algorithm: transforms an input text by \mixing" it with a randomly chosen bit
string { the key, to produce the cipher text. In a symmetric encryption algorithm, the
plain text can be recovered by applying the key to the cipher text.
hashing: hashing is accomplished by applying a function to an arbitrary length message to
create a digest/hash value, which is usually of xed length.
key: an input provided by the user of a cryptographic system. This piece of information is kept
secret and is the source of security in a cryptographic system. Although some times a part
of key information is made public, in which case the secret part is the source of security.
message authentication codes : is a symmetric cryptographic primitive that is used for providing authenticity.
plain text, cipher text: the cipher text is the \scrambled" version of an original source { the
plain text. It is assumed that the scrambled text, produced by an encryption algorithm,
can be inspected by persons not having the key and not reveal the content of the source.

9 Further Information
Current research in cryptology is represented in the Proceedings the conferences: CRYPTO,
EUROCRYPT, ASIACRYPT, AUSCRYPT. There are also more specialized conferences dealing with topics such as: hashing, fast software encryption, and security. The proceedings are
published by Springer in their LNCS series. The Journal of Cryptology, IEEE Proceedings on Information Theory, Designs Codes and Cryptography and several other journals publish extended
versions of the articles which were presented in the above mentioned conferences.
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